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The tiny Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan became the world’s 
newest democracy this year when its first-ever multi-party 
election ended over a century of monarchical rule. On March 
24, over 80% of eligible Bhutanese voters heeded the King’s 
order and flooded the polls to cast their votes. The Druk 
Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) secured a landslide victory, 
winning forty-five out of forty-seven seats in the National 
Assembly. What explained the recent political regime 
transformation from an absolute monarchy to democracy in 
the Kingdom of Bhutan?  
 
Questions relating to why certain countries transition to a 
democracy when some others do not, have been among the 
most pivotal and heatedly debated issues for the study of 
democracy. Over the course of forty years, several political 
theorists, such as Samuel Huntington and Seymour Martin 
Lipset, have tried to outline a broad conceptual framework for 
the types of societies that would be “conducive” to the 
emergence and the sustainability of democracy. Yet, each 
time an odd case comes along (i.e. Singapore, South Africa) 
that defies the cookie-cutter theoretical structure. This 
prompts political scientists to revisit old theories and draw up 
new ones to explain such outliers. To this end, our 
understanding of democratisation is not a static set of beliefs, 
but a rather fluid and ever-changing view. Bhutan’s transition 
to democracy is an exceptionally unique case that will help 
enrich the overall literature on democracy as well as further 
enhance our understanding of the most studied political 
system in the world.  
 
Three questions will be discussed in this paper. First, can the 
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recent regime change in Bhutan be contributed to a classical 
modernisation theory? Although many advocates of 
modernisation theory have received their fair share of 
criticism over the years, the theory has stood the test of time 
relatively well1 and has remained one of the most cited 
democratisation schools of thought, especially in Asia where 
the correlation between the level of economic development 
and stable democracy is strongest with the advent of 
democracy in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan occurring at 
around the same time as the establishments of their 
economic institutions. It is no surprise that followers of 
Bhutanese politics may attribute the recent change in the 
country’s political system to the rise in the population’s 
income. But is this the case of Bhutan? 
 
Second, if the structuralist school of thought, including the 
modernisation theory, does not explain the introduction of 
democracy to Bhutan’s political system, then what might 
explain the phenomenon? Can a competing theory of the 
study of regime change – the voluntarist school of thought – 
bears the answers to such question? 
 
Third, what are the implications of the answers to the above 
two questions to the future of the political system in Bhutan? 
What might be challenges that are laying ahead for the 
proponents of democracy in Bhutan? Moreover, how can the 
case of Bhutan’s democratisation enrich the overall 
knowledge of the theories of regime study amongst political 
scientists? 
 
Few case studies offer a clear-cut voluntarist approach more 
clearly than Bhutan. Indeed, the transition to democracy is 
single-handedly introduced and carried out by the monarchy 
itself. Despite several signs of improved social and economic 
conditions amongst the populace, the Bhutanese people have 
                                              
1 Fukuyama, F (2005). “Confucianism and Democracy,” in L. 
Diamond, M. F. Plattner & P. J. Costopoulos (eds.) World Religions 
and Democracy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
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neither developed a sizable middle class nor a sense of civic 
and political consciousness to push for political change. Quite 
the contrary, whenever the monarchy implements 
modernisation or liberalisation reforms, the Bhutanese public 
resists any change that would devolve the power away from 
their beloved monarch. Consequently, the historic 
transformation of the system of governance to democracy 
represents, by and large, a directive from the royal family, not 
the wish of the people. The people have entrusted their 
benevolent King to know what would be best for the country, 
and would only be too happy to follow his order.  
 
The first part of the essay will focus on theoretical framework 
of structuralist and voluntarist approaches on political regime 
change. The second part will address Bhutan’s underlying 
social and economic conditions prior to the regime 
transformation. Analyses will be given as to why regime 
change was not called for by the mass, but rather instigated 
by the ultimate leader of the nation. The historic election, to 
most Bhutanese, represents a “change in continuity”2, rather 
than a holistic political transformation.  
Structuralist v. Voluntarist 
The study of regime transformation is dominated by two 
competing theories: structuralism and voluntarism.3 Some 
                                              
2 This term was coined by Thierry Mathou in Mathou, T (2000). “The 
politics of Bhutan: Change in continuity,” Journal of Bhutan Studies, 
2(2), 250-262. Retrieved from 
http://www.digitalhimalaya.com/collections/journals/jbs/pdf/JBS_
02_02_09.pdf  
3 Refer  to the following literature for analyses of structuralist and 
voluntarist arguments: O’Donnell, G. & Schmitter, P (1986). 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press; Bermeo, N (1990). “Rethinking Regime 
Change,” Comparative Politics, 22, 359-377; Mahoney, J. & Snyder, 
R (1999). “Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime 
Change,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 34(2), 3-
32.; Adeney, K & Wyatt, A (2004). “Democracy in South Asia: Getting 
Beyond the Structure-Agency Dichotomy,” Political Studies, 52 (1): 1-
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political scientists have referred to them as the “structure-
agency dichotomy” (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004, p.1). According to 
the structuralists, a regime change relies on factors such as 
“class, sector and world-systematic political economy.”4 
Human actions are either caused or highly influenced by their 
social and economic positions. Modernisation theory is an 
integral part of the structuralist argument for it embraces the 
idea that choices made by human entities are influenced or 
shaped by their socio-economic positions. In the trailblazing 
work of Moore, he first pinpointed that bourgeois revolutions 
culminate the Western form of democracy.5 The middle class 
in Britain and France - empowered by their new economic 
fortunes - began to demand political freedom from the ruling 
landed upper class.6 What ensued was a bourgeois revolt 
against the old establishments. Likewise, Lipset argues that 
there is a relationship between the degree of economic 
development and the chance to sustain a democracy.7 A 
country with a lower level of wealth distribution, less 
widespread education and greater degree of class struggle can 
breed radicalism because these factors precipitate discontent. 
Several other scholars have also identified linkage between 
capitalist development and a chance to sustain democracy. 
 
Other factors such as institutional structures, past conflicts 
or colonialism are considered instrumental in having long-
term impacts on subsequent political developments.8 As 
                                                                                                 
18.    
4 Mahoney, J & Snyder, R (1999). “Rethinking Agency and Structure 
in the Study of Regime Change,” Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 34(2), p. 3.    
5 Moore, B., Jr. (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: 
Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon 
Press, p. xxi.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Lipset, S. M. (1998). Democracy in Asia and Africa. Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly, p. 31. 
8 Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H. & Stephens, J. D. (1992). 
Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, p. 23.  
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Luebbert points out, “…no stable interwar regime was formed 
that lacked mass support, each regime was based on a 
distinctive social or class alliance, and each regime had clear 
material winners and losers” (Luebbert, 1991, p. 306). 
Furthermore, the dependency theory put forth by O’Donnell 
has been used to explain why some Latin American countries 
that had undergone late, but nonetheless, rapid economic 
growth opted for an authoritarian regime. In the heart of his 
argument, O’Donnell posits that economic dependence tends 
to “create pressures towards authoritarian rule” (see 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens, 1992, p. 22). Literature 
on structuralist approaches has dominated the study of 
regime change in the past few decades.9
 
Voluntarist approaches have emerged as a competing school 
of thought that seeks to credit human behavior as key to 
regime transformation. Varying regime outcomes are a result 
of agential motivations and interest calculations, rather than 
their socio-economic roles. The voluntarist arguments place 
an importance on interests of political actors that are not 
necessarily rested on social or economic grounds. In The 
Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Stepan & Linz, 1978), 
Stepan and Linz attribute the overthrow of President Joao 
Goulart by the military to Goulart’s style of leadership, 
political acts and strategies and personality.10 While 
acknowledging structural factors, such as macro-economic 
environment, in particular the withdrawal looming economic 
crisis, Stefan concludes that they are not sufficient to cause a 
regime collapse where a political leader can play a “special 
                                              
9 Refer to works by Moore, B., Jr. (1966). Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press; O’Donnell, G (1973). 
Modernisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South 
American Politics. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, Politics 
of Modernisation Series No. 9; Luebbert, G. (1991). Liberals, 
Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins 
of Regimes in Interwar Europe. New York: Oxford University Press. 
10 Stepan, A & Linz, J (eds.). (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic 
Regimes. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, p. 133. 
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role in bringing the regime to a final breakdown point.”11 
Likewise, Almond, Flanagan and Mundt discuss in their book 
Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political 
Development (Almond, Flanagan & Mundt, 1973) that political 
actors do have room to maneuver, or “a range of freedom of 
choice”(see Mahoney & Snyder, 1999, p.16), when it comes to 
the final decision making. In sum, voluntarist theorists 
believe that structures are “external constraints, which actors 
may or may not encounter as they pursue their goals.”12
 
What really distinguishes the structuralist from the 
voluntarist arguments is the level of analysis. Structuralism 
gives way to macro-level analysis, which encompasses factors 
such as world system, economic development, domestic-
structural and institutional.13 To be sure, structuralists 
believe that a country’s level of economic development, its 
strategic position in the international arena, “objective social 
groups defined by their socio-economic positions” (Mahoney & 
Snyder, 1999, p.9), political parties and military or judicial 
institutions contribute to a change in regime. On the other 
hand, voluntarists focus on micro-level elements, such as 
political leadership and subjective social groups, as sufficient 
explanations for a regime change. Critics of the structuralist 
approach argue that the theory underestimates the role of 
human agency during a change of regime. Although human 
actions are shaped by their socio-economic positions, the 
theory “overlooks the possibility that actors may have 
margins of maneuverability during periods of regime change” 
(Mahoney & Snyder, p. 5). Moreover, structuralism is seen to 
be “overly deterministic” (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004, p.5). 
Democracy has triumphed in some developing countries that 
did not possess the social and economic prerequisites often 
referred to when describing Western democracies.  
 
                                              
11 Ibid., p. 132. 
12 Mahoney, J & Snyder, R (1999). “Rethinking agency and structure 
in the study of regime change,” Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 34(2), p. 5. 
13 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Bhutan offers another unique perspective on regime 
transformation. It is argued that, in the case of the recent 
regime transformation in Bhutan, the structuralist argument 
cannot offer stand-alone explanations to the political change. 
The voluntarist school of though indeed provides better 
explanations to what is taking place in the Bhutanese 
political system. The liberalisation reforms carried out by 
absolute monarchs have, on the one hand, created 
unprecedented growth in Bhutan’s economy in recent years, 
yet on the other, it has neither created critical mass of the 
middle class nor developed political consciousness among the 
mass to push for political change. King Wangchuck single-
handedly instigated the political regime change in the country 
as part of continuously unfolding political liberalisation 
process. 
Modernisation, Bhutanese style 
The recent transition from absolutism to a multi-party system 
can only be appreciated within the wider context of changing 
social and economic landscape within the Bhutanese society. 
It is argued that the gradual and structural transformations 
in the Bhutanese societies have brought important changes to 
the country’s socio-economic development, but have not 
developed key components that would have enticed a change 
in regime. In other words, peaceful transformation of the 
Bhutanese society has not given rise to popular support for a 
regime change. Unlike many other cases in the study of 
regime collapses throughout Latin America and Asia, the 
King’s decision to transform the country’ governance is not 
reactionary to a political or economic calamity. Rather, it is a 
carefully planned and calculated decision. Four notable 
structural factors are worth mentioning in the following 
paragraphs to demonstrate the relatively unconventional 
pattern of Bhutanese modernisation: 1) astounding economic 
advancement with minimal industrialisation, 2) a growing 
wealth disparities with a low level of class struggle, 3) a 
relatively high ratio of uneducated citizenry and 4) a still 
relatively isolated country with minimal outside interference. 
To be sure, these factors do not always bring about instability 
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but they have brought some societies to a crisis point where 
popular discontent threatens an existing regime. The uneven 
and imbalanced development in Bhutan, ironically, has 
produced peace and stability in the country. 
Economic advancement with minimal industrialisation 
Bhutan has entered an extended period of gradual 
modernisation without actually undergoing a process of 
industrialisation. This has two major implications: 1) neither 
a working class nor middle class have developed in mass and 
2) the existing class structure in the society remains relatively 
unchanged. The middle class is seen as a driver of the 
 
Figure 1: Key indicators determining a degree of 
industrialisation (1980-2007) 
 1980 1987 1995 2001 2007 
Population employed in 
agriculture 
85% 87.5% n/a 79% 75% 
Agricultural contribution 
to GDP 
56% 45% 38% 27% 22% 
Manufacturing 
contribution to GDP 
4% 6% 9% 6% n/a 
Primary energy 
consumption14 
(quadrillion Btu) 
0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Sources: Planning Commission of Bhutan, World Bank, UNDP, IEA 
 
democratisation process because middle class actors play key 
roles in revolutionary movements. Moore’s analysis of Britain 
and France’s transition to democracy places great emphasis 
on the role of the educated and well-to-do middle class, who 
demanded political concessions from the ruling elites. 
Without a strong or large middle class, there are fewer 
incentives to create redistributions from the elites to 
citizens.15 Likewise, an organised or large working class can 
                                              
14 Primary energy includes petroleum, dry natural gas and coal, and 
net hydroelectric, solar, geothermal, wind, and wood and waste 
electricity. Also includes net electricity imports. 
15 Acemoglu, D & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Economic Origins of 
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pose a threat to an established order, as evidence in 
Luebbert’s analyses on the origins of liberalism, fascism and 
social democracy in interwar Europe.  
 
Bhutan was a late developer, but unlike many of its Asian 
counterparts, it was not trying to catch up with the West. 
King Jigme Singye Wangchuck was careful to modernise the 
state without “Westernising” it – ensuring that the 
preservation of their rich cultural heritage was regarded as 
utmost important. Bhutan’s social and economic 
transformations have been focused primarily on the basic 
needs of the citizens, such as access to water, sanitation and 
electricity, rather than to place high emphasis on developing 
industries per se. As a result, Bhutan has not experienced 
modern industrialisation in the sense of creating a strong 
manufacturing base. From 1980 to 2001, the size of the 
manufacturing sector remains largely unchanged (see Figure 
1). Six out of eight Bhutanese still earn their living in the 
countryside, despite the declining importance of the primary 
sector to the nations’ overall gross domestic product (GDP). 
Another major indicator for a degree of a country’s 
industrialisation is the energy consumption level among the 
populace. Bhutan is one of the lowest energy consumers in 
the world, ranking 162nd among its peers, with most of its 
people relying on traditional firewood for cooking and heating.  
 
Figure 2: Key Development Indicators in Bhutan, 1985-2005 
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
/2007 
GDP per capita, PPP ($) 1259 1914 2781 3685 5703 
Life expectancy (years) 43 49 57 62 65 
Roads paved n/a 77 64 61 62 
Telephone per 100 
inhabitants 
0 0 1 3 11 
Internet users per 100 
inhabitants 
n/a n/a 0 1 5 
Adults with no  90% 85% n/a 75% 70% 
                                                                                                 
Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 40. 
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Schooling (over the  
age of 25) 
Doctors per 10,000 
people 
0.5 0.8 n/a 1.7 2.3 
Urban population % ** 4.5 5.5 6.0 7.7 9.1 
Sources: World Development Indicators, UNESCO, UNDP, WHO, 
National Statistical Bureau of Bhutan, Planning Commission of 
Bhutan 
* UNESCO estimates 
** For 1990 and 1995, the figures are averages calculated by the 
author 
 
Bhutan managed to quadruple its GDP in the past twenty-
years by doing practically one thing: building the Chukha 
Hydroelectricity power plant. In other words, the average 
annual GDP growth rate of almost 7% since 1985 has been 
exclusively propelled by the commissioning and the 
construction of the hydro power plant.16 The building of the 
power plant, temporarily, spurred employment in the energy-
related industries (i.e. cement and ferro alloys).17 However, by 
and large, energy is not a job-creating sector, which is 
reflected in the still high employment rate in the agricultural 
sector of the economy. In addition, nearly 90% of firms in 
Bhutan are micro enterprises or very small family-run 
businesses, recording revenue of under $22,000 per year.18
 
The relatively underdeveloped industrial sector in Bhutan 
results in a weak private sector, a small middle class as well 
as the working class. The entire economy is wholly dependent 
on directives from the government (and the King) to introduce 
any social and economic changes. In fact, neither the middle 
class nor the working has any incentives to challenge the 
public order because their economic well-being is almost 
entirely dependent upon the public sector. The government 
planned and orchestrated the construction of the hydropower 
                                              
16 UNDP  (2007). Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction: The Case 
Study of Bhutan, p. 182. Retrieved from 
http://www.undp.org.bt/poverty/docs/Macroeco_cs_for_Bhutan.pdf   
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 209. 
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plant – the single, major source for the development of 
industries. Incentives and projected benefits are crucial in the 
process of democratic consolidation because without them, 
changes to the established order are neither wanted nor 
attractive. 
Growing wealth disparities in relative peace 
Policies of gradual modernisation and sustainable 
development have yielded an interesting contrast within the 
Bhutanese society: rising inequality with minimal societal 
tension. How could this happen? There are several 
explanations to this unusual development. It is because, 
historically, Bhutan was a nation of subsistence farmers and 
landowners. Consequently, the Bhutanese do not suffer from 
starvation; such is the case in other South Asian countries, 
for everyone is entitled to a minimum amount of agricultural 
land, given freely by the state, on which to grow food for 
oneself. The state also gives away enough timber for everyone 
to build modest houses.19  As a result, while one-third of the 
population can be categorised as “poor”,20 the country as a 
whole does enjoy a high level of human development.21 This is 
an important point, because it means that the majority of the 
population’s basic needs are met, although they are poor in 
terms of their wealth accumulation. Coupled with the fact 
that the poor do have land and accommodation, it would be 
much less plausible for them to have a grudge against the 
state or to feel drawn to any populist ideas of land or wealth 
redistribution. Indeed, the growing rural-urban inequality is 
not a result of the state’s neglect, but rather the harsh 
geographical reality that has made efforts to equalise socio-
economic development much more challenging.  
 
                                              
19 Ibid., p. 39. 
20 UNDP (2007). Poverty Analysis Report 2007, p. 5. Retrieved from 
http://www.undp.org.bt/poverty/docs/PAR_2007.pdf.  
21 Based on the UNDP Human Development Indicators (HDI) that 
measure improvement in life’s expectancy, access to basic services, 
enrollment in primary schools, etc. 
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The government’s set of policies are heavily geared towards 
benefiting the poor. First of all, the state relies heavily on 
non-tax revenue, primarily from the sales of hydroelectricity. 
Direct taxes, at the beginning of the fiscal reforms in the 
1980s, were virtually non-existent and have been kept 
minimal to this day.22 This implies that as the country grows 
economically, the elites will not be burdened with increased 
taxes – a situation that makes consolidating democracy more 
attractive and cost-efficient.23 The share of non-tax revenue 
also stands to increase in the coming years, allowing the 
government more independence in its expenditure. Normally 
in the cases of many authoritarian regimes, when the 
government’s revenue comes from sales of natural resources, 
such as oil and gas, it severely decreases the level of 
government’s accountability to its own people. However, in 
the case of Bhutan, the situation is quite the contrary: over 
one-quarter of the total government’s budget is earmarked for 
heath and educational programs. More importantly, due to 
the policy of fiscal decentralisation, government officials at 
the local level are permitted to spend twenty-five percent of 
their budgets on local needs, bypassing approval from the 
national level.24 The high level of government’s support for 
rural development is not only unwavering, but increasing on 
a yearly basis. In sum, the self-sufficient and land-owning 
nature of most Bhutanese, along with the government’s heavy 
focus on helping the poor, have smoothened out the otherwise 
potentially divisive impacts of growing inequality among the 
various classes in society. 
A high level of adult illiteracy 
Five in eight adults in Bhutan have had no schooling (see 
                                              
22 Budget Summary 2007-2008. 
23 Acemoglu, D & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Economic Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 36. 
24 UNDP (2007). Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction: The Case 
Study of Bhutan, p. 4. Retrieved from 
http://www.undp.org.bt/poverty/docs/Macroeco_cs_for_Bhutan.pdf 
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Figure 2) – an illiteracy rate so high it bogs down many other 
developmental efforts.25 Many scholars have suggested that 
the higher the level of education, the greater the chances for 
democracy. Researchers have found that the more educated 
the citizens, the more likely they are “to believe in democratic 
values and supported democratic practices.”26 During the 
run-up to the parliamentary elections, government officials 
and volunteers were sent out into the countryside to educate 
the public about the meaning of democracy and civic 
governance. Two mock elections and countless training 
sessions were completed to ensure that the election would go 
smoothly for a country whose majority of the adult population 
cannot read or write. Right after the election, a group of 400 
people from three towns voiced their concerns during the 
royal audience that democratic transition may have been 
introduced too early as “illiterate villagers moved from one 
party to the other and were swayed by whatever said to them” 
(Kuensel Online, 2008) and that too few people really 
understood the meaning of democracy.27
 
In sum, while Bhutan has undergone through drastic, albeit 
gradual, structural transformation in its economy through 
decades of modernisation, the country lacks key components 
that would have led to a popular demand for a regime change. 
The imbalances in the country’s socio-economic development 
only substantially increased the level of income per capita, 
                                              
25 In comparison to other developing nations in Asia, such 
development represents an uncommon occurrence. In comparison to 
other Asian countries with a similar level of income, Bhutan has a 
much lower rate of literacy and level of urbanisation. See figures for 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Philippines, and Maldives on the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). For lower income countries in the 
same region, see Nepal and Bangladesh. 
26 Smith, G. H. (1948). “Liberalism and Level of Information,” Journal 
of Educational Psychology, 39: 65-82. 
27 People appeal to His Majesty. (2008, April 2). Kuensel Online. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=artic
le&sid=10124. 
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yet, other development figures, be it literacy rate, level of 
urbanisation, and infrastructure, have not made the same 
speed of progress.28 International development agencies have 
also acknowledged this rather unusual development that, due 
to the slow rate of health and educational attainment that is 
progressing over the years, it is very likely that the increase in 
the level of human development was a result of an income 
rise only.29 As a result of these uneven developments, the 
Bhutanese society lacks a sizable middle class (and working 
class), educated citizenry, intra-group tension that would 
have precipitated regime discontent among the public. 
Modernisation theory, consequently, cannot explain the 
regime change to democracy in Bhutan. 
An isolated state, with minimal external interference 
The long, extended period of isolation imposed by the early 
Kings may have served Bhutan well, but it has also kept its 
neighbors at bay. Having escaped Britain's colonial 
aggression in South Asia and subsequently secured India's 
recognition of its independence, Bhutan went into isolation 
and maintained its traditional monarchical rule. Bhutan had 
reasons to feel vulnerable as it was the only surviving 
Mahayana Buddhist kingdom, after Sikkim was absorbed by 
India to the south and Tibet was annexed by China to the 
north. The monarchy played an immensely important role in 
consolidating fragmented Himalayan groups and exemplifying 
a unifying force for the development of the Bhutanese state. 
The country's historians point out that Bhutan would have 
fallen prey to the Indian dominance had it not been because 
of the monarchical institution.30 Indeed, the only way for 
                                              
28 Over 20 years, GNI increased by six fold, while literacy rate 
increased two and a half times, and percentage of urban population 
increased two times. 
29 UNDP (2007). Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction: The Case 
Study of Bhutan, p. 38. Retrieved from 
http://www.undp.org.bt/poverty/docs/Macroeco_cs_for_Bhutan.pdf 
30 Rose, L. E. (1977). The Politics of Bhutan. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, p. 107. 
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Bhutan to maintain its sovereignty was for the country to 
enter an extended period of isolation to allow time for the 
monarchy to establish itself as the only legitimate institution. 
The backwardness of the nation made it much easier for the 
monarchs to consolidate their power and become the absolute 
ruler of the people, whose political consciousness was not yet 
developed.  
 
Although Bhutan slowly came out of self-imposed isolation in 
the 1980s, no outside powers were exerting pressure for 
democracy in Bhutan in the lead-up to last week's election. 
Bhutan has long remained closed to outsiders, 
maintaining diplomatic relations with very few countries 
(mostly in Asia). Huntington argues that democratisation in a 
country may be influenced by “the actions of governments 
and institutions external to that country.”31 Successful 
demonstrations in one country can encourage 
demonstrations elsewhere since they create a contagion 
effect.32 India is Bhutan’s closest and longest ally, whose 
relationships extends from economic to military. Through 
decades of India’s assistance to Bhutan, political differences 
between the two nations were never given significance.33 India 
is also the only stable democracy in Bhutan’s immediate 
vicinity. Yet, due to the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949, India 
pledged non-interference in Bhutan’s domestic affairs.34 
Bhutan had sought no relationship with its northern 
neighbor, China, for security concern after Tibet was annexed 
in 1951. Memberships at international organisations were 
                                              
31 Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third wave: Democratisation in the 
Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, p. 
85. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Galay, K (2004). “International Politics of Bhutan,” Journal of 
Bhutan Studies, 10: 90-108. Retrieved from 
http://www.bhutanstudies.org.bt/main/pub_detail.php?pubid=89. 
34 Choden, T (2003). “Indo-Bhutan International Relations: Recent 
Trends.” Paper presented at the Regional Conference on 
Comprehensive Security in South Asia. Kathmandu: Institute for 
Foreign Affairs, p. 114. 
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gradually sought after in the early 1970s, with most 
organisations present in Bhutan are on humanitarian 
grounds and focus mostly on development work. Being seen 
as a peaceful, traditional society by most outsiders has 
helped the monarch escape scrutiny for its authoritarian 
nature. 
 
Some observers of Bhutanese politics have tried to develop a 
connection between the social, anti-monarchist unrest in 
Nepal to the stepping down of the Bhutanese monarchy. The 
domestic politics in Nepal may have raised concerns about 
the “future” status of the monarchy amongst the ruling 
monarchs, but it, in no way, directly puts pressure on the 
King to abolish absolute monarchy. Unlike King Gyanendra of 
Nepal, who faced over a decade of demonstrations and 
popular uprisings before he finally announced the demise of 
the country’s monarchy, King Wangchuck of Bhutan is widely 
popular and highly revered among the public. The extremely 
high level of power and legitimacy that the Bhutanese 
monarch upholds is unmatched by most leaders in the world, 
democratically and undemocratically elected. Many 
Bhutanese widely believe that their Kings would take better 
care of them than any other politicians.35 The general public 
took the news of his abdication with grief, sadness, and fear 
to what the future might hold for them without the King.36 
Better yet, the elites were completely caught off guard and 
repeatedly pleaded to the King to reconsider his decision.  
Then they were “asked” by the King to reorganise themselves 
as parties in preparation for the upcoming parliamentary 
election.37
                                              
35 Gier, N (2008). “Two Himalayan Kingdoms Give up their Kings,” 
New West Wire, Retrieved from 
http://www.newwest.net/main/article/two_himalayan_kingdoms_gi
ve_up_their_kings/ 
36 Chiramal, J. M. (2008). “Dragon Kingdom’s Date with Democracy,” 
Kuensel Online. Retrieved from 
http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=artic
le&sid=10230. 
37 Sinpeng, A. (2008). “Bhutan: The world’s Youngest Democracy,” 
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Democracy: A long envisioned goal 
The political transformation in Bhutan was a clear case of 
voluntarism – a situation whereby the leader, in this case the 
King, decided to give up his power irrespective of his social, 
economic or political position. In fact the country was stable 
and prospering, facing no immediate political threat both 
from the domestic and the international realm. While many 
dictators and military juntas around the world – not to 
mention the royal family of neighbouring Nepal – are using 
both coercions and military might to hang on to power, His 
Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck concluded that his throne 
had come to an end and Bhutan must transition to 
democracy. When he announced his abdication in 2006, he 
clarified that democracy was not necessarily Bhutan's goal, 
but a part of good governance and a key pillar of the King's 
ultimate objective: to achieve Gross National Happiness 
(GNH). Innovated by the King himself, the GNH became the 
country's benchmark to development - promoting a more 
balanced and equitable development that preserves Bhutan's 
rich, cultural heritage. In order for the country to achieve 
"collective happiness", its citizen must become empowered, in 
the King's view.   
 
The change of regime was therefore not reactionary to any 
social, economic or political calamities, but a rather long-
intended, carefully carved out plan. As Chiramal suggests, 
“the transition to democracy was no overnight phenomenon, 
but an ongoing process.”38 King Wangchuck had envisioned, 
in the early 1980s, that eventually Bhutan would need to 
move away from an absolute monarchy.39 His Majesty says 
                                                                                                 
The Globalist. Retrieved from 
http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/storyid.aspx?StoryId=6899. 
38 Chiramal, J. M. (2008). “Dragon Kingdom’s Date with Democracy,” 
Kuensel Online. Retrieved from 
http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=artic
le&sid=10230 
39 Part of King Wangchuck’s address to the people of Haa illuminates 
his thinking: “On the introduction of a parliamentary democracy His 
Majesty explained that the Constitution was being established for 
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that,  
 
“I do not believe that the system of absolute monarchy, 
wholly dependent on one individual, is a good system for 
the people in the long-run. Eventually, no matter how 
carefully royal children are prepared for their role, the 
country is bound to face misfortune of inheriting a King of 
dubious character.”40
 
These words were not a break from the past for the monarchy 
– as such conviction was passed on since the foremost King. 
The first steps towards democratic transition had, as a result, 
been initiated long before the recent election in 2008. For 
example, in 1953, the National Assembly (Tshogdu) was 
established by the third King despite the public’s reluctance. 
“Although the people said they were not ready for such a 
forum, the King insisted on the establishment of the National 
Assembly to discuss issues of national interest, promote 
public welfare and develop political consciousness among the 
people so that they could play a greater role in the decision 
making process and running of the country.”41   
 
Successive Kings follow in the path to gradually liberalise the 
country’s system of governance through a series of 
                                                                                                 
the future well being of the country and the people. His Majesty said 
that Monarchy is not the best form of government for Bhutan as it 
has many flaws. His Majesty pointed out that, in times to come, if 
the people were fortunate the heir to the Throne would be a 
dedicated and capable person. On the other hand the heir could be a 
person of mediocre ability or even an incapable person. That would 
create problems for a small country like Bhutan.” See “The 
Constitution: Are We Ready?” (2005, November 5). Kuensel Online. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=artic
le&sid=6217 
40 UNDP (2007). Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction: The Case 
Study of Bhutan, p. 42. Retrieved from 
http://www.undp.org.bt/poverty/docs/Macroeco_cs_for_Bhutan.pdf 
41 About the National Assembly of Bhutan.  (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 
2008 from http://www.nab.gov.bt/aboutus.php. 
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decentralisation measures.  In 1981, King Wangchuck further 
decentralised the country’s administration by dividing the 
country into twenty districts (dzongkhags) and set up the 
District Development Committees to involve local citizens in 
consultations on the development of their own districts.42 The 
decentralised system of governance is most pronounced at 
the local level where a group of villagers form a constituency 
called “gewog” and is administered by “gup” who is elected by 
the people.43 At the village level gups can settle petty 
disputes. The most ambitious change towards the 
development of decentralisation came in 1998 when the King 
devolved his executive powers to the Council of Ministers who 
is elected by Member of the Parliament (Chimis). This means 
that, for the first time, the government would be elected 
directly by the Parliament. The king even instigated more 
power to the Parliament by reinstating the vote of confidence 
in the monarchy. With the decentralised system of 
governance in place, local people would be able to decide the 
faith of the monarchy.44
 
The monarchy understands the peril of a tyranny and does 
not want to maintain the single-ruler system, despite its 
astounding success in consolidating a once fragmented 
nation and restoring peace and prosperity to the people. That 
is why King Wangchuck gave up his throne at the height of 
his power, while there is peace and prosperity within the 
country. In essence, King Wangchuck’s decision to transition 
to democracy is a “pre-emptive” one, under the assumption 
that such regime change is inevitable in the future and it is 
better to make a peaceful and orderly transformation rather 
than a violent one. Once the decision has been made to 
                                              
42 Bhutan adopted the First Five-Year Plan from India, which 
provided the bulk of the assistance (both advisory and financial) and 
continues to be the major donor of the Kingdom. 
43 Political System. (n.d.) Retrieved May 3, 2008 from 
http://www.bhutan.gov.bt/government/abt_politicalsystem.php 
44 UNDP (2002). Decentralisation: Bringing People Closer to the 
People. UNDP Program in Bhutan, Discussion Paper. Retrieved from 
http://www.undp.org.bt/Governance/Decentralisation.pdf. 
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transition to parliamentary democracy, the monarchy traveled 
extensively for two years throughout the country to discuss 
the drafting of the constitution with various professionals, 
local leaders and villagers.45 It was the King’s vision to ensure 
that the country’s first modern constitution would be 
representative of the people.46
 
What is most interesting about the political transformation of 
Bhutan is that it represents a true “royal directive” by the 
monarchy, rather than a proposed change by the elites or the 
public. For a country with a large share of uneducated and 
politically docile population, one would suspect the elites to 
play a greater role in propelling political change. In reality, 
however, the elites have simply objected to the monarch’s 
wish to devolve his power to them.47 The Bhutanese people, in 
general, are conservative in nature and have deep reverence 
                                              
45 Australia -Bhutan Friendship Association. (n.d.). Bhutan Becomes 
the World’s Youngest Democracy. Retrieved April 2, 2008 from 
http://www.australiabhutan.org.bt/abfanews.htm#TravellersandMa
gicians. 
46 A speech from the 2005 Nation Address: “During 2006-2007, the 
Election Commission will educate our people in the process of 
parliamentary democracy and electoral practice sessions will be 
conducted in all the 20 dzongkhags. After 26 years of the process of 
decentralisation and devolution of powers to the people, I have every 
confidence that our people will be able to choose the best political 
party that can provide good governance and serve the interest of the 
nation. I would like our people to know that the first national 
election to elect a government under a system of parliamentary 
democracy will take place in 2008.” 
47 A man who observed the king’s audience spoke: “On the eve of the 
centenary of our Monarchy, it is too painful to even conceive of the 
idea of the Druk Gyalpo (the King) relinquishing the Throne.” 
Another woman also said, “I never expected to see the day when our 
own children would discuss such outrageous issues in His Majesty’s 
presence. How can Bhutanese people talk about a King stepping 
down? Or impeaching the Druk Gyalpo? Or the other personal 
matters of the royal family?” Refer to the full text: “The Constitution: 
Are We Ready?” (2005, November 5). Kuensel Online. Retrieved from 
http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=artic
le&sid=6217. 
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towards the King and would prefer the paternalistic style of 
governance under the directions of the monarchy. It is a 
common occurrence throughout Bhutanese political history 
that the people would make pleas and requests for 
reconsideration to the monarchy every time the King ordered 
any devolution of power from himself to either organs of 
governments or to the local level of administration.48
Future implications 
The impact of the recent multi-party election may not be 
dramatic at first, but it will have far reaching consequences to 
the democratic development of the entire nation. One thing 
for certain is that the monarchy is here to stay. The 
monarchy may have given up rule on paper, but its power 
remains in force. The time for Bhutan's political transition 
was deliberately chosen; there is stability and peace in the 
country, and the royal family has the people's trust. It came 
as no surprise that both the DPT and the People's Democratic 
Party (PDP) shared a strikingly similar political platform – a 
continuation of the monarch's policies – though the latter 
proposed for a faster change of pace. The first democratic 
election of Bhutan was not contested, for it lacked real 
alternatives to the existing discourse. As the new leadership 
takes its place, King Wangchuck's system of governance, 
public policy, and official discourse will carry on. The people 
of Bhutan will continue to regard their King as the Guardian 
of the nation, who “will ensure stability and protect the long-
term interests of the people.”49  
 
Nevertheless, there remain significant challenges for the 
                                              
48 “The constitution: Are We Ready?” (2005, November 5). Kuensel 
Online. Retrieved from 
http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=artic
le&sid=6217. 
49 Looking for a team. (2008, February 14). Kuensel Online. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=artic
le&sid=9853. 
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future of democracy in Bhutan. Despite over two decades of 
gradual political liberalisation in preparation for the 
introduction of the new system, there is no telling that 
democracy would be sustainable. First of all, there seems to 
be no real opposition force in the political scene. At least for 
now, the monarchists will be the only political group running 
the show. Royalist bureaucrats and civil servants will 
continue to occupy important positions in the government. 
The heavy reliance on the King’s policy preference may 
impede the development of political parties in Bhutan. In 
essence, if all parties wish to follow the King’s path, then 
there will be little differentiation in policies or platforms of 
each party. In such case, party politics may be of marginal 
utility or significance to Bhutan’s political system. Moreover, 
the transition to democracy in Bhutan after centuries of 
monarchical rule will certainly give rise to “royalists” or 
“monarchists” who will continue to be prominent on the 
political scene for years to come. Only time can tell whether 
this is a curse or a blessing. To put it in comparative 
perspective, that is what occurred in Thailand, where 
royalists prompted a coup in 2006, more than 70 years after 
the end of monarchy’s rule, to topple a democratically elected 
government.  
 
Secondly, civil liberties in Bhutan remain limited despite 
recent signs of improvement. The Freedom House has given 
the country 3.72 scores for civil liberty (0=weakest; 
7=highest), with very low points on freedom of association 
and protection of ethnic minorities.50 The main reason why 
Bhutan scores low in this category is due to the relatively new 
concept of civic freedom. After more than a century of 
monarchic rule, such ideas have only been introduced 
recently in the form of political decentralisation and social 
liberalisation. The King himself began to educate the 
Bhutanese people of their rights and duties as citizens51 and 
                                              
50 Freedom House. (2007). Freedom Around the World: Bhutan. 
Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
51 Freedom House. (2007). Countries in Crossroads: Bhutan. Civil 
Liberties. Retrieved from 
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civic consciousness is just beginning to be formed. The 34-
Article Constitution also lays grounds for the development of 
civil society, to ensure that citizens have the right to freedom 
of expression. However, foreign observers, such as Freedom 
House, argue that the Bhutan Information, Communications 
and Media Act and National Security Act have limited the free 
flow of information, the protection of journalists and the 
freedom of expression.52 The Editor-in-Chief of Kuensel, the 
largest state-run newspaper in Bhutan, acknowledged in 
2006 that the role of government in media is “all-pervasive” 
and calls for government subsidies would mean trading off 
the media’s independence.53 Independent media has only 
been given permission to be established in 2006, by the King 
himself, and already some occasional criticisms towards the 
government have begun to emerge through its website. On 
recent occasion, Bhutan Observer, an independent 
newspaper, criticised the government officials for being 
denied accessed to the meeting between prime ministers of 
India and Bhutan, citing “…only the state-run media are 
allowed. This is not democracy” (Bhutan Observer, 2008).54
 
Lastly, forces of globalisation will pose both an immediate and 
                                                                                                 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&c
crcountry=150&section=86&ccrpage=37. 
52 Freedom House. (2007.) Freedom Around the World: Bhutan. 
Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org. For full disclosure of 
Bhutan’s Information, Communications and Media Act, see 
http://www.bicma.gov.bt/final%20ICM%20as%20of%2025th%20OC
T06.pdf. The 1992 National Security Act stipulates that any criticism 
of the king or Bhutan’s political system is prohibited. Such 
stipulation, however, is not uncommon among constitutional 
monarchies in today’s world. For full disclosure of the document, 
follow the link below. 
http://www.oag.gov.bt/images/acts/National%20Security%20Act.p
df.   
53 Dorji, K (2006). “Media in Bhutan: Now and Then,” Journal of 
Bhutan Studies, 14, p. 8. 
54 Media rights. (2008, May 23). The Bhutan Observer. Retrieved from 
http://www.bhutanobserver.bt/2008/editorial/05/media-
rights.html. 
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long-term threat to the identity and the cultural heritage of 
Bhutan. Past success of the absolute monarchy and the 
recent first-ever election rests upon the fact that Bhutan is an 
insular, conservative kingdom with strong roots to its 
traditions and little access to the outside world. To preserve 
its culture, the King was careful to modernise Bhutan without 
westernising it. Recognising that Bhutan cannot remain 
isolated forever, the King began to open the country up slowly 
to the outside world. In 1999, television was introduced for 
the first time in the country. The public reaction was mixed: 
some say that violence seen on television and movies has led 
to increased violence and fighting among youths – a 
phenomenon which contradicts the deeply cherished values of 
peace and non-violence among the Bhutanese.55 In response 
to public concerns the potential danger of uncensored 
television, the Association of Private Cable Operators imposed 
restrictions to allow only thirty channels with “a complete ban 
of twelve music and other channels that provided 
‘controversial’ content.”56 Moreover, a 1989 and its 
subsequent royal decrees require that all wear the national 
dress while in public during daylight hours. In 2004, Bhutan 
became the first country in the world to ban the sale and use 
of tobacco. Only the test of time can tell whether or not 
Bhutan can withstand the test of globalisation and its impact 
on its culture. 
Conclusion 
The transition to democracy in Bhutan will serve as a unique 
example to the study of regime change for years to come. 
Since the 1970s, few cases in the sphere of regime study offer 
a clear-cut voluntarist approach, whereby agential actions are 
evidently responsible for the transformation of a country’s 
political system. Most of the literature on regime change has 
                                              
55 Lubow, A (2008). The Changing Face of Bhutan. The Smithsonian 
Institute. Retrieved from 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/da-bhutan.html  
56 Freedom House (2007). Freedom Around the World: Bhutan. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org.    
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focused heavily towards the structuralist argument – leaving 
much room for the voluntarist counterpart to make its case.  
 
When observing the country’s social and economic 
development in the past two decades, it is clear that although 
Bhutan has gone through the modernisation process in the 
past two decades, the society is not “ripe” for a regime 
change. Indeed, the country lacks several major components 
that would have made a democratic consolidation attractive 
to the public at large. First, the country has not undergone 
the conventional industrialisation process based on the 
emergence and the acceleration of the industrial or 
manufacturing sector. Bhutan has been able to increase its 
gross output by relying solely on the commissioning and 
construction of its most important natural resources: water. 
Secondly, the wealth that is being created through the sales 
of hydroelectricity has over the years increased the income 
gap among the populace, but has not, surprisingly, resulted 
in any social unrest or tension. That is because the 
government has focused its efforts almost exclusively on 
providing for the poor – guaranteeing a sufficient piece of 
land, accommodation, free healthcare and subsidies for 
farming activities. Better yet, the government is not forced to 
raise taxes to finance their expenditure on rural development 
because its major source of earning comes directly from the 
sales of hydroelectricity. The intra-group inequality has 
neither bred class struggle nor provided the public an 
impetus to dissent the monarchical regime. Thirdly, the 
overwhelmingly high share of uneducated adults in Bhutan 
does not give strong basis for the development of political 
consciousness, civic responsibilities or an appreciation for 
democracy. Lastly, Bhutan experiences minimal interference 
from its more powerful neighbors, such as India or China. 
The lack of external influence means that the existing regime 
could operate without pressure to change from abroad. 
 
It was the monarchy who has brought about democracy in 
Bhutan voluntarily, unpressured by any social or economic 
tensions. In fact, it was at the height of the King’s power, with 
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peace, stability and prosperity within the country that he 
decided to abdicate from power to give way to democracy. The 
very nature of his voluntary act was best exemplified by a 
series of petitions, gatherings, and demonstrations from both 
the public and the elites who pleaded repeatedly for the 
monarch to reconsider his decision. Some of the concerned 
citizens voiced their suspicions over the question of whether 
or not Bhutan was indeed “ready” for democracy. However, 
King Wangchuck reassured his people that democracy would 
bring more good than harm to the entire nation. The high 
level of trust that the King received from his people was 
sufficient to mobilise the country towards democracy. The 
exceptionally high voter turnout of the country’s first-ever 
election is a testament to the power and legitimacy that the 
King has to his subjects.  
 
The case study of Bhutan can, in addition, enrich the 
theoretical framework of the study of regime transformation. 
Several political scientists have pointed out that the 
voluntarist school of thought is a more pertinent explanation 
for the regime change by way of revolution.57 In no case where 
there is a transition to democracy caused mainly by agential 
action represents “an evolution” of regime transformation. 
That is mostly because a gradual political liberalisation from 
an authoritarian system to a democratic one takes not only 
time, but an isolated state where no outside influence can 
have a profound effect on the country’s political future. 
Bhutan offers this unique situation because it lacks in what 
Fish terms “external patronage” (Fish, 2001, p. 325) - a 
situation when a great power has asserted dominance in 
another country’s affairs – that could greatly impact 
                                              
57 See Stepan, A. & Linz, J. (Eds.). (1978). The Breakdown of 
Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press; Di 
Palma, G (1990). To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic 
Transitions. Berkeley: University of California Press; Fish, S. M. 
(2001). “The Inner Asian Anomaly: Mongolia’s Democratisation in 
Comparative Perspective,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 
34: 323-338. 
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democratisation in the country.58 The relative level of 
isolation, strong culture of political compromise and a high 
level of consensus among the people have made it possible for 
Bhutan to gradually transition to a democracy.  
 
                                              
58 Fish, S. M. (2001). “The Inner Asian Anomaly: Mongolia’s 
Democratisation in Comparative Perspective,” Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, 34: 323-338.   
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